Given a ciphertext, is it possible to prove the deletion of the underlying plaintext? Since classical ciphertexts can be copied, clearly, such feat is impossible using classical information alone. In stark contrast to this, we show that quantum encodings allow such certified deletion. More precisely, we show that it is possible to encrypt classical data into a quantum ciphertext such that the recipient of the ciphertext can produce a classical string which proves to the originator that the recipient has relinquished any chance of recovering the plaintext, should the decryption key be revealed. Our scheme is feasible with current quantum technology: the honest parties only require quantum devices for single-qubit preparation and measurements, and is robust against noise in these devices. Furthermore, we provide an analysis that is suitable in the finite-key regime.
Introduction
Consider the following scenario: Alice sends a ciphertext to Bob, but in addition, she wants to encode the data in a way such that Bob can prove to her that he deleted the information contained in the ciphertext. Such a deletion should prevent Bob from retrieving any information on the encoded plaintext once the decryption key is revealed. We call this certified deletion.
Informally, this functionality stipulates that Bob should not be able to do the following two things simultaneously: (1) Convince Alice that he has deleted the ciphertext; and (2) Given the key, recover information about the encrypted message. To better understand this concept, consider an analogy to certified deletion in the physical world: "encryption" would correspond to locking information into a keyed safe, the "ciphertext" comprising of the locked safe. In this case, "deletion" may simply involve returning the safe in its original state. This "deletion" is intrinsically certified since, without the safe (and having never had access to the key and the safe at the same time), Bob is relinquishing the possibility of gaining access to the information (even in the future when the key may be revealed) by returning the safe. However, in the case that encryption is digital, Bob may retain a copy of the ciphertext; there is therefore no meaningful way for him to certify "deletion" of the underlying information, since clearly a copy of the ciphertext is just as good as the original ciphertext, when it comes time to use the key to decrypt the data.
Quantum information, on the other hand, is known for its no-cloning principle [Die82, Par70, WZ82] , which states that quantum states cannot, in general, be copied. This quantum feature has been explored in many cryptographic applications, including unforgeable money [Wie83] , quantum key distribution (QKD) [BB84] , and more (for a survey, see [BS16] ).
Summary of Contributions
In this work, we add to the repertoire of functionalities that are classically impossible, but that quantum information allows to achieve with unconditional security. We give the first formal definition of certified deletion encryption and certified deletion security. Moreover, we construct an encryption scheme which, as we demonstrate, satisfies these notions (in addition, our proofs are applicable in the finite-key regime). Furthermore, our scheme is technologically simple since it can be implemented by honest parties who have access to rudimentary quantum devices (that is, they only need to prepare single-qubit quantum states, and perform single-qubit measurements); we also show that our scheme is robust against noise in these devices. We now elaborate on these contributions.
Definitions
Our first contribution is in the area of definitions (see Section 3). We build on the quantum encryption of classical messages (QECM) framework [BL19] in order to explicate our notion of encryption (for simplicity, our work is restricted to the single-use, private-key setting). Here, we specify both a decryption key and an auxiliary key: The decryption key is used for decrypting a ciphertext, whereas both the decryption and auxiliary keys are used for encryption. To the QECM, we add a delete circuit, used by Bob if he wishes to delete his ciphertext and generate a corresponding verification state, and a verify circuit, which uses both the auxiliary and decryption keys, and is used by Alice to determine whether Bob really deleted the ciphertext.
Next, we define the notion of certified deletion security for a QECM scheme (See Fig. 1 and Definition 3.5). The starting point for this definition is the well-known indistinguishability experiment, this time played between an adversary A = (A 0 , A 1 , A 2 ) and a challenger. After running the Key Generation procedure, the adversary A 0 submits an n-bit plaintext msg 0 to the challenger. Based on a random bit b, the challenger either encrypts msg 0 or a dummy plaintext 0 n , and sends the ciphertext to A 1 . The adversary A 1 then produces a candidate "deletion certificate", y. Next, the decryption key is sent to the adversary A 2 , who produces a guess b ′ ∈ {0, 1}. A scheme is deemed secure if the probability that both y is accepted and b = b ′ is negligibly close to 1 2 . We note that certified deletion security does not necessarily imply indistinguishability, and hence these two properties are defined and proved separately. In Section 4, we present our scheme. Our encoding is based on the well-known Wiesner encoding [Wie83] . Informally, the message is encoded by first generating m random Wiesner states, |r θ (r, θ ∈ {0, 1} m ) (for notation, see Section 2.1). We let r| I be the substring of r where qubits are encoded in the computational basis, and we let r|Ī be the remaining substring of r (where qubits are encoded in the Hadamard basis). Then, in order to create a proof of deletion, Bob measures the entire ciphertext in the Hadamard basis. The result is a classical string, and Alice accepts the deletion if all the bits corresponding to positions encoded in the Hadamard basis are correct according to r|Ī. As for the message msg, it is encoded into x ′ = msg ⊕ H(r| I ) ⊕ u, where H is a two-universal hash function and u is a fresh, random string. The use of the hash function is required, intuitively, in order to prevent that partial information retained by Bob could be useful in distinguishing the plaintext, whereas the random u is used to guarantee security in terms of an encryption scheme. Robustness of the protocol is achieved by using an error correcting code and including an encrypted version of the error syndrome. We note that while our definitions do not require it, our scheme provides a further desirable property, namely that the proof of deletion is a classical string only.
Proof
In Section 5, we present the security analysis of our scheme and give concrete security parameters (Theorem 5.11 and its proof). First, the fact that the scheme is an encryption scheme is relatively straightforward; it follows via a generalization of the quantum one-time pad (see Section 5.1). Next, correctness and robustness (Section 5.2) follow from the properties of the encoding and of the error correcting mechanism. Next, the proof of security for certified deletion has a number of key steps. First, we apply the security notion of certified deletion (Definition 3.5) to our concrete scheme (Scheme 4.1). This yields a "prepare-and-measure" security game (see Game 5.3). However, for the purposes of the analysis, it is convenient to consider instead an entanglement-based game (this is a common proof technique for quantum protocols that include the preparation of random states [LC99, SP00] ). In this game (Game 5.4), the adversary, Bob, creates an initial entangled state, from which Alice derives (via measurements in a random basis θ of her choosing) the value of r ∈ {0, 1} m . Interestingly, we show that without loss of generality, in this game, Bob can produce the proof of deletion, y, before he receives any information from Alice (this is due, essentially, to the fact that the ciphertext is uniformly random from Bob's point of view). Averaging over Alice's choice of basis θ, we arrive at a very powerful intuition: in order for Bob's probability of creating an acceptable proof of deletion y (i.e., he produces a string, where the positions corresponding to θ = 1 match with r|Ī) to be high, he must unavoidably have a low probability of correctly guessing r| I . The above phenomenon is embodied in the following entropic uncertainty relation for smooth entropies [TR11, TLGR12] , where we consider the scenario of Eve preparing a tripartite state ρ ABE , with Alice, Bob and Eve receiving the A, B and E systems, respectively (here, A and B contain n qubits). Next, Alice either measures all of her qubits in the computational basis to obtain string X, or she measures all of her qubits in the Hadamard basis to obtain string Z, whereas Bob measures his qubits in the Hadamard basis to obtain Z ′ . We then have the relation:
In the above, ǫ ≤ 0 is a smoothing parameter which represents a probability of failure, and the smooth min-entropy H ǫ min (X | E) characterizes the average probability that Eve guesses X correctly, using her optimal strategy, and given her quantum register E, while the smooth max-entropy, H ǫ max (Z | Z ′ ) corresponds to the number of bits that are needed in order to reconstruct Z from Z ′ , up to a failure probability ǫ (for details, see Section 2.4).
Our proof technique thus consists in formally analysing the entanglement-based game and applying the appropriate uncertainty relation in the spirit of the one above. Finally, we combine the bound on Bob's min-entropy with a universal 2 hash function, which, together with the Leftover Hashing Lemma of [Ren05] , are used to prove indistinguishability between the cases b = 0 and b = 1 after Alice has been convinced of deletion.
Related Work
To the best of our knowledge, the first use of a quantum encoding to certify that a ciphertext is completely "returned" was developed by Unruh [Unr14] in the context of revocable timed-release encryption: in this case, the revocation process is fully quantum. Fu and Miller [FM18] gave the first evidence that quantum information could be used to prove deletion of information, and that this could be verified using classical interaction only: they showed that, via a two-party nonlocality game (involving classical interaction), Alice can become convinced that Bob has deleted a singlebit ciphertext (in the sense that the deleted state is unreadable even if Bob were to learn the decryption key). Their results are cast in the device-independent setting (meaning that security holds against arbitrarily malicious quantum devices). Further related work (that is independent from ours) by Coiteux-Roy and Wolf [CW19] touches on the question of provable deletion using quantum encodings, but only provides a candidate scheme, which is then broken within the same work-therefore leaving open the general question of certified deletion.
Relationship with Quantum Key Distribution. It can be instructive to compare our results to the ones obtained in the analysis of QKD [TL17] . Firstly, our adversarial model appears different, since in certified deletion, we have one honest party (Alice, the sender) and one cheating party (Bob, the receiver), whereas QKD involves two honest parties (Alice and Bob) and one adversary (Eve). Next, the interaction model is different, since certified deletion is almost noninteractive, whereas QKD involves various rounds of interaction between Alice and Bob. However, the procedures and proof techniques for certified deletion are close to the ones used in QKD: we use similar encodings into Wiesner states, similar privacy amplification and error correction, and the analysis via an entanglement-based game uses similar entropic uncertainty relations, leading to a security parameter that is very similar to the one in [TL17] . While we are not aware of any direct reduction from the security of a QKD scheme to certified deletion, we note that, as part of our proof technique, we manage to essentially map the adversarial model for certified deletion to one similar to the QKD model, since we split the behaviour of our adversarial Bob into multiple phases: preparation of the joint state ρ ABE , measurement of a register B in a determined basis, and finally bounding the advantage that the adversary has in simultaneously making Alice accept the outcome of the measurement performed on B, and predicting some measurement outcome on register A, given quantum side-information E. This scenario is similar to QKD, although we note that the measurement bases are not chosen randomly, but are instead consistently in the Hadamard basis (for Bob's measurement), and Eve's challenge is to predict Alice's measurement in the computational basis only (this situation is reminiscent of the single-basis parameter estimation technique [TL17, PLWC16]).
Applications and Open Questions
While the main focus of this work is on the foundations of certified deletion, we can nevertheless envisage potential applications, which we briefly discuss below (we leave the formal analyses for future work).
Protection against data retention. In 2016, the European Union adopted a regulation on the processing and free movement of personal data [The16] . Included is a clause on the "right to be forgotten": a person should be able to have their data erased whenever its retention is no longer necessary. Certified deletion encryption might help facilitate this scenario in the following way: if a party were to provide their data to an organization via a certified deletion encryption, the organization would be able to certify deletion of the data using the deletion circuit included in the scheme.
Encryption with classical revocation. The concept of ciphertext revocation allows a recipient to provably return a ciphertext (in the sense that the sender can confirm that the ciphertext is returned, and that the recipient will not be able to decrypt, even if the decryption key is leaked in the future); such a functionality is unachievable with classical information alone, but is known to be achievable using quantum ciphertexts [Unr14] . In a sense, our contribution is an extension of revocation, since from the point of view of the recipient, whether quantum information is deleted or returned, the end result is similar: the recipient is unable to decrypt, even given the decryption key. Our scheme, however, has the advantage of using classical information only for the deletion.
As a use case for classical revocation, consider a situation where Bob loans Alice an amount of money. Alice agrees to pay back the full amount in time T plus 15 percent interest if Bob does not recall the loan within that time. To implement this scheme, Alice uses a certified deletion encryption scheme to send Bob an encrypted cheque, and schedules her computer to send Bob the key at time T . If Bob wishes to recall the loan within time T , he sends Alice the deletion string. Another possible application is timed-release encryption [Unr14] , where the decryption key is included in the ciphertext, but encoded in a classical timed-release encryption.
Everlasting Security. Using our quantum encoding, it may be possible to transform a long-term computational assumption into a temporary one. That is, that a computational assumption would need to be broken during a protocol, or else the security is information-theoretically secure as soon as the protocols ends. This is called everlasting security [Unr13] .
For example, consider the situation encountered in a zero-knowledge proof system for a Σprotocol (for instance, for graph 3-colouring [GMW91] ): the prover commits to an encoding of an NP-witness using a statistically binding and computationally concealing commitment scheme. The verifier then randomly chooses which commitments to open, and the prover provides the information required to open the commitment. If, in addition, we could encode the commitments with a scheme that provides certified deletion, then the verifier could also prove that the unopened commitments are effectively deleted. This has the potential of ensuring that the zero-knowledge property becomes statistical as long as the computational assumption is not broken during the execution of the proof system. This description assumes an extension of our certified deletion encoding to the computational setting, and also somehow assumes that the verifier would collaborate in its deletion actions (we leave for future work the formal statement and analysis). Nevertheless, since zeroknowledge proofs are building blocks for a host of cryptographic protocols, certified deletion has the potential to unleash everlasting security, which is highly desirable given steady progress in both algorithms and quantum computers.
Outline
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 is an introduction to concepts and notation used in the rest of this work. Section 3 lays out the novel security definitions which appear in this paper. Section 4 is an exposition of our main scheme, while Section 5 provides a security analysis.
In this section, we outline certain concepts and notational conventions which are used throughout the article. We assume that the reader has a basic familiarity with quantum computation and quantum information. We refer to [NC00] for further background.
Notation
We make use of the following notation: for a function f :
We represent the Hamming weight of strings as the output of a Hamming weight function ω: {0, 1} * → N. If x 1 , . . . , x n are strings, then we define (x 1 , . . . , x n ) to be the concatenation of these strings. Let [n] denote the set {1, 2, . . . , n}. Then, for any string x = (x 1 , . . . , x n ) and any subset I ⊆ [n], we use x| I to denote the string x restricted to the bits indexed by I. We call a function η: N → R ≥0 negligible if for every positive polynomial p, there exists an integer N such that, for all integers n > N , it is true that η(n) < 1 p(n) . We let Q := C 2 denote the state space of a single qubit, and we use the notation Q(n) := Q ⊗n for any n ∈ N. Let H be a Hilbert space. The set of unitary operators on H is denoted by U (H), and the set of density operators on H is denoted by D(H). Through density operators, a Hilbert space may correspond to a quantum system, which we represent by capital letters. The set of diagonal density operators on H is denoted by D(H)-the elements of this set represent classical states. Discrete random variables are thus modeled as finite-dimensional quantum systems, called registers. A register X takes values in X . A density operator |x x| will be denoted as |x x|. We employ the operator norm, which we define for a linear operator A: H → H ′ between finitedimensional Hilbert spaces H and H ′ as
(3)
Moreover, for two density operators ρ, σ ∈ D(H), we use the notation ρ ≤ σ to say that σ − ρ is positive semi-definite. In order to illustrate correlations between a classical register X and a quantum state A, we use the formalism of a classical-quantum state:
where P X (x) := Pr[X = x] ρ = Tr[|x x| X ρ XA ] and ρ A|X=x is the state of A conditioned on the event that X = x. Let |x i x i | ∈ D(H) be classical states for integers i such that 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Then we use the notation |x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n | := |x 1 x 1 | ⊗ |x 2 x 2 | ⊗ · · · ⊗ |x n x n | .
Let H ∈ U (Q) denote the Hadamard operator, which is defined by
For any strings x, θ ∈ {0, 1} n , we define
States of the form x θ are here called Wiesner states in recognition of their first use in [Wie83] . We make use of the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) state [EPR35] , defined as
We use x $ ← − X to denote sampling an element x ∈ X uniformly at random from a set X. This uniform randomness is represented in terms of registers in the fully mixed state which is, given a d-dimensional Hilbert space H, defined as 1 d 1 d , where 1 d denotes the identity matrix with d rows. For two quantum states ρ, σ ∈ D(H), we define the trace distance
The operational meaning of the trace distance is that two states α and β can be distinguished through measurement with probability at most 1 2 + α − β Tr . We define purified distance, which is a metric on quantum states.
Definition 2.1 (Purified Distance). Let A be a quantum system. For two states ρ A , σ A , we define the generalized fidelity,
and the purified distance,
Hash Functions and Error Correction
We make use of universal 2 hash functions, first introduced by Carter and Wegman [CW79] . Such families exist if |Z| is a power of two (see [CW79] ). Moreover, there exist universal 2 families of hash functions which take strings of length n as input and which contain 2 O(n) hash functions; therefore it takes O(n) bits to specify a hash function from such a family [MNWC81] . Thus, when we discuss communication of hash functions, we assume that both the sender and the recipient are aware of the family from which a hash function has been chosen, and that the transmitted data consists of O(n) bits used to specify the hash function from the known family.
In the context of error correction, we note that linear error correcting codes can generate syndromes, and that corrections to a message can be made when given the syndrome of the correct message. This is called syndrome decoding. Therefore, we implicitly refer to syndrome decoding of an [n, n − s]-linear code which handles codewords of length n and generates syndromes of length s < n when we use functions synd: {0, 1} n → {0, 1} s and corr: {0, 1} n × {0, 1} s → {0, 1} n , where synd is a syndrome-generating function and corr is a string-correcting function. We also make reference to the distance of an error correcting code, which is the minimum distance between distinct codewords.
Quantum Channels and Measurements
Let A and B be two quantum systems, and let X be a classical register. A quantum channel
A positive-operator valued measure (POVM) on A is a set of Hermitian positive semidefinite oper-
We also represent measurements with CPTP maps such as M A→X , which map quantum states in system A to classical states in register X using POVMs. For two registers X and Y , if we have a function, f :
In this work, measurement of a qubit in our scheme will always occur in one of two bases: the computational basis ({|0 , |1 }) or the Hadamard basis ({|+ , |− }). Thus, for a quantum system A, we notate these measurements as {M θ,x A } x∈{0,1} , where x ∈ {0, 1} ranges over the possible outcomes, and where θ ∈ {0, 1} determines the basis of measurement (θ = 0 indicates computational basis and θ = 1 indicates Hadamard basis).
Let {M x A } x and {N y A } y be two POVMs acting on a quantum system A. We define the overlap
Wherever dealing with an m-qubit quantum system A, we define, for all i = 1, . . . , m,
We assume our measurements are ideal. Therefore,
Entropic Uncertainty Relations
The purpose of entropy is to quantify the amount of uncertainty an observer has concerning the outcome of a random variable. Since the uncertainty of random variables can be understood in different ways, there exist different kinds of entropy. Key to our work are min-and max-entropy, first introduced by Renner 
Max-entropy quantifies the size of the support of a random variable, and is here defined by its dual relation to min-entropy.
Definition 2.4 (Max-entropy). Let A and B be two quantum systems. For any bipartite state ρ AB , we define
where ρ ABC is any pure state with Tr C [ρ ABC ] = ρ AB , for some quantum system C.
In order to deal with finite-size effects, it is necessary to generalize min-and max-entropy to their smooth variants. 
It is of note that smooth entropies satisfy the following inequality, commonly referred to as the data-processing inequality [TCR10] .
Proposition 2.6. Let ǫ ≥ 0, ρ AB be a quantum state, and E:
We use the following uncertainty relation, introduced by Tomamichel and Renner [TR11] , and expanded upon in [Tom12] . It was originally understood in terms of its application to QKD, and was used to prove the secrecy of the key in a finite-key analysis of QKD [TLGR12] . 
where q = log 1 c and c = max
and
We also use the Leftover Hashing Lemma, introduced by Renner [Ren05] . It is typically understood in relation to the privacy amplification step of QKD. We state it in the form given in [TL17] .
Proposition 2.8. Let ǫ ≥ 0 and σ AX be a classical-quantum state, with X a classical register which takes values on X = {0, 1} s . Let H be a universal 2 family of hash functions from X to
for the function f : (x, H) → H(x) be the post-hashing state. Then,
Statistical Lemmas
The following lemmas are required to bound a specific max-entropy quantity. They are both proven in [TL17] as part of a security proof of finite-key QKD, and this line of thinking originated in [TLGR12] .
The following lemma is a consequence of Serfling's bound [Ser74] . 
It will also be useful to condition a quantum state on future events. This is called "smoothing". The following lemma from [TL17] states that, given a classical-quantum state, there may exist a nearby smooth state on which a certain event does not occur. 
Quantum Encryption and Security
Whenever an adversary A is mentioned, it is assumed to be quantum and to have unbounded computational power, and we allow it to perform generalized measurements.
Considering that the scheme introduced in this paper is an encryption scheme with a quantum ciphertext, we rely on the "quantum encryption of classical messages" framework developed by Broadbent and Lord [BL19] . This framework describes an encryption scheme as a set of parameterized CPTP maps which satisfy certain conditions. Definition 2.11 (Quantum Encryption of Classical Messages). Let n be an integer. An n-quantum encryption of classical messages (n-QECM) is a tuple of uniform efficient quantum circuits S = (key, enc, dec) implementing CPTP maps of the form
where H M = Q(n) is the plaintext space, H T,λ = Q(ℓ(λ)) is the ciphertext space, and H K,λ = Q(κ(λ)) is the key space for functions ℓ, κ:
, and m ∈ {0, 1} n , the maps must satisfy
where λ is implicit, Φ enc k is the CPTP map defined by ρ → Φ enc (|k k| ⊗ ρ), and we define Φ dec k analogously. We also define the CPTP map Φ enc k,0 :
where 0 ∈ {0, 1} n is the all-zero bit string, and the CPTP map Φ enc k,1 :
As part of the security of our scheme, we wish to ensure that should an adversary obtain a copy of the ciphertext and were to know that the original message is one of two hypotheses, she would not be able to distinguish between the hypotheses. We refer to this notion of security as indistinguishable security. It is best understood in terms of a scheme's resilience to an adversary performing what we refer to as a distinguishing attack.
Definition 2.12 (Distinguishing Attack). Let S = (key, enc, dec) be an n-QECM. A distinguishing attack is a quantum adversary A = (A 0 , A 1 ) implementing CPTP maps of the form
where H S,λ = Q(s(λ)) for a function s:
Definition 2.13 (Indistinguishable Security). Let S = (key, enc, dec) be an n-QECM. Then we say that S is indistinguishable secure if for all distinguishing attacks A there exists a negligible function η such that
where λ is implicit on the left-hand side, b ∈ {0, 1}, and K λ is the random variable distributed on {0, 1} κ(λ) such that Pr[K λ = k] = Tr |k k| Φ key λ (1) .
Security Definitions
In this section, we introduce a new description of the certified deletion security notion. First, however, we must augment our QECM framework to allow it to detect errors on decryption.
Definition 3.1 (Augmented Quantum Encryption of Classical Messages). Let n be an integer. Let S = (key, enc, dec) be an n-QECM. An n-augmented quantum encryption of classical messages (n-AQECM) is a tuple of uniform efficient quantum circuitsŜ = (key, enc, dec, where dec implements a CPTP map of the form Φ dec λ :
For all λ ∈ N + , k ∈ {0, 1} κ(λ) , and m ∈ {0, 1} n , the maps corresponding to the circuits must satisfy
where λ is implicit, Φ enc k is the CPTP map defined by ρ → Φ enc (|k k| ⊗ ρ), and we define Φ dec k analogously.
The extra qubit (which will be referred to as a flag), though by itself without any apparent use, may serve as a way to indicate that the decryption process did not proceed as expected in any given run. In the case of decryption without error, the circuit should output |1 1|, and in the case of decryption error, the circuit should output |0 0|. This allows us to define a criterion by which an AQECM might be robust against a certain amount of noise.
Since the original QECM framework will no longer be used for the rest of this paper, we henceforth note that all further references to the QECM framework are in fact references to the AQECM framework. 
and for two distinct messages m, m ′ ∈ H M , we have that
In other words, a QECM is ǫ-robust if, under interference by an adversary, the event that decryption yields a different message than was encrypted and that the decryption circuit approves of the outcome is less than or equal to ǫ.
Our description takes the form of an augmentation of the QECM framework described in Definition 3.1. Given a QECM with key k and encrypting message m, the certified deletion property should guarantee that the recipient, Bob, cannot do the following two things simultaneously:
• Make Alice, the sender, accept his certificate of deletion; and
• Given k, recover information about m.
Definition 3.3 (Certified Deletion Encryption). Let S = (key, enc, dec) be an n-QECM such that
is the decryption key space and H K ′′ ,λ = Q(κ ′′ (λ)) is the auxiliary key space for functions κ ′ , κ ′′ : N + → N + ; and
• for all λ ∈ N + , k = (k ′ , k ′′ ) ∈ {0, 1} κ ′ (λ)+κ ′′ (λ) , and m ∈ {0, 1} n , it must hold that
where λ is implicit.
Let del and ver be efficient quantum circuits implemented by CPTP maps of the form
where H D,λ = Q(d(λ)) for a function d:
where λ is implicit. We call the tuple S ′ = (key, enc, dec, del, ver) an n-certified deletion encryption (n-CDE).
Definition 3.4 (Certified Deletion Attack). Let S = (key, enc, dec, del, ver) be an n-CDE. A certified deletion attack is a quantum adversary A = (A 0 , A 1 , A 2 ) implementing CPTP maps of the form
where H S,λ = Q(s(λ)) and H T ′ ,λ = Q(ℓ ′ (λ)) for functions s, ℓ ′ : N + → N + .
We are now ready to define our notion of Certified Deletion Security. We refer the reader to Section 1.1.1 for an informal explanation of the definition, and we recall that notation Φ enc k,b is defined in Eq. (29).
Definition 3.5 (Certified Deletion Security). Let S = (key, enc, dec, del, ver) be an n-CDE. For any fixed and implicit λ ∈ N + , we define the CPTP map Φ ver k :
Then we say that S is η-certified deletion secure if for all certified deletion attacks A, there exists a function η such that
We say that S is certified deletion secure if there exists such a function η that is negligible. We define a noise-tolerant prepare-and-measure n-CDE by Circuits 1-5. This scheme satisfies both Equation (37) and Equation (38). It is therefore an n-CDE.
We note that in Section 3, we allow for the general case of both an auxiliary and decryption key -both keys are accessible to the encryption and verification circuit, but the decryption circuit only has access to the decryption key. Furthermore, after the verification, only the decryption key is revealed. This makes our definition more general, and our scheme makes use of this framework, since the string r is in the auxiliary key only (otherwise, letting r be part of the decryption key would clearly make certified deletion impossible, since correctness would follow without the quantum portion of the ciphertext. However, we note that, strictly speaking, ver only requires the portion q = r|Ī of the auxiliary key, and that in fact the certified deletion property holds if we include q in the decryption key. This means that the use of an auxiliary key is unnecessary in our scheme; we have nevertheless chosen to include it for ease of presentation.
Circuit 1:
The key generation circuit key.
Input : None. Output : An auxiliary key state ρ ∈ D(Q(m)) and a decryption key state σ ∈ D(Q(m + n + µ + τ ) ⊗ H pa ⊗ H ec )). 
Circuit 3: The decryption circuit dec.
Input : A decryption key state |θ, u, d, e, H pa , H ec θ, u, d, e, H pa , H ec | ∈ D(Q(m + n + µ + τ ) ⊗ H pa ⊗ H ec ) and a ciphertext ρ ⊗ |c, p, q c, p, q| ∈ D(Q(m + n + µ + τ )). Output : A plaintext state σ ∈ D(Q(n)) and an error flag γ ∈ D(Q). 
If ω(q ⊕ŷ ′ ) < kδ, output 1. Else, output 0.
Security Analysis
In this section, we present the security analysis for Scheme 4.1: in Section 5.1, we show the security of the scheme in terms of an encryption scheme, then, in Section 5.2, we show that the scheme is correct and robust. Finally in Section 5.3, we show that the scheme is a certified deletion scheme.
Indistinguishable Security
In considering whether Scheme 4.1 is indistinguishable secure (Definition 2.13), one need only verify that an adversary, given a ciphertext, would not be able to discern whether a known message was encrypted.
Theorem 5.1. Scheme 4.1 is indistinguishable secure.
Proof. For any distinguishing attack A = (A 0 , A 1 ), any state ρ = ρ S ⊗ |msg msg| ∈ D(H S ⊗ Q(n)), and where k = (r, θ, u, d, e, H pa , H ec ) ∈ {0, 1} m+n+µ+τ × H pa × H ec is a key, we have that
where the second equality is due to the uniform distribution of both msg ⊕ x ⊕ u and u.
Correctness
Thanks to the syndrome and correction functions included in the scheme, the decryption circuit is robust against a certain amount of noise; that is, below such a level of noise, the decryption circuit outputs Alice's original message with high probability. This noise threshold is determined by the distance of the linear code used. In particular, where ∆ is the distance of the code, decryption should proceed normally as long as fewer than ⌊ ∆−1 2 ⌋ errors occur to the quantum encoding of r| I during transmission through the quantum channel.
To account for greater levels of noise (such as may occur in the presence of an adversary), we show that the error correction measures implemented in Scheme 4.1 ensure that errors in decryption are detected with high probability. In other words, we show that the scheme is ǫ rob -robust, where ǫ rob := 1 2 τ . Recall that τ is the length of the error correction hash, and that µ is the length of the error correction syndrome. Consider that Bob has received a ciphertext state ρ B ⊗ |c, p, q c, p, q| ∈ D(Q(m + n + µ + τ )) and a decryption key (θ, u, d, e, H pa , H ec ) ∈ Θ × {0, 1} n+µ+τ × H pa × H ec . Given θ, Bob learns I. This allows him to perform the following measurement on ρ B :
The new register Y contains a hypothesis of the random string Alice used in generating c. Since ρ B was necessarily transmitted through a quantum channel, it may have been altered due to noise. Bob calculates a corrected estimate:x = corr(y, q ⊕ e). Finally, he compares a hash of the estimate with p ⊕ d, which is the hash of Alice's corresponding randomness. This procedure is represented by a function ec:
To record the value of this test, we use a flag F ec := ec(x, p ⊕ d). It is very unlikely that both F ec = 1 and the outcome of Bob's decryption procedure is not equal to Alice's originally intended message. This is shown in the following proposition, the proof of which follows that of an analogous theorem in [TL17] .
Theorem 5.2. Where r ∈ {0, 1} m is the random string Alice samples in key generation, and x = corr(y, q ⊕ e),
Proof. 
Certified Deletion Security
We now prove certified deletion security of Scheme 4.1. Our technique consists in formalizing a game (Game 5.3 that corresponds to the security definition (Definition 3.5) applied to Scheme 4.1. Next, we develop an entanglement-based sequence of interactions (Game 5.4) which accomplish the same task as in the previous Game (the formal proof that an upper bound on the winning probability of Game 5.4 is an upper bound on the winning probability of Game 5.3 is postponed until Section 5.4).
To begin, we describe a game which exhibits a certified deletion attack on Scheme 4.1, and which thus allows us to examine whether the scheme has certified deletion security. In what follows, the challenger represents the party who would normally encrypt the message, and the adversary A represents the recipient. The adversary sends the challenger a candidate message msg 0 ∈ {0, 1} n and Alice chooses, with uniform randomness, whether to encrypt 0 n or msg 0 ; the adversary's task is to guess which one has been encrypted.
Game 5.3 (Prepare-and-Measure Game). Let S = (key, enc, dec, del, ver) be an n-CDE with λ implicit, and with circuits defined as in Scheme 4.1. Let A = (A 0 , A 1 , A 2 ) be a certified deletion
Denote
Compute 
If b ′ = b, then A wins the game.
Per Definition 3.5, we say that Scheme 4.1 is certified deletion secure if the probability that A wins Game 5.3 is bounded above by 1 2 + η(λ), where λ is the security parameter and η is a negligible function.
Instead of directly analyzing Game 5.3, we analyze a game wherein the parties use entanglement; essentially, this allows us show to express the game in a format that is conducive for the analysis that follows. Please note, as we will show in Section 5.4, the probability that Bob wins Game 5.3 is bounded above by the probability that Bob wins Game 5.4. Game 5.4 is intended to model a purified version of Game 5.3. Note that Bob's measuremement of B in the Hadamard basis is meant to mimic the del circuit of Scheme 4.1. Although it may seem strange that we impose a limitation of measurement basis on Bob here, it is in fact no limitation at all; indeed, since Bob prepares ρ ABB ′ , he is in total control of the state that gets measured, and hence may assume an arbitrary degree of control over the measurement outcome. Therefore, the assumption that he measures in the Hadamard basis is made without loss of generality.
It may also appear that the adversary in Game 5.3 has more information when producing the deletion string than Bob in Game 5.4. This, however, is not true, as the adversary in Game 5.3 has only received information from Alice that appears to him to be uniformly random (as mentioned, the statement is formalized later, in Section 5.4). In order to further the analysis, we assign more precise notation for the maps described in Game 5.4.
Bob's measurements. Measurement of Bob's system B of m qubits in Step 1 is represented using two CPTP maps: one acting on the systems in I, with outcome recorded in register Y ; and one acting on the systems inĪ, with outcome recorded in W . Note, however, that Bob has no access to θ, and therefore has no way of determining I. The formal separation of registers Y and W is simply for future ease of specifying the qubits to which we refer.
Recall the definition of the measurements M x,y B from Section 2.3. The first measurement, where the outcome is stored in register Y , is defined by
Alice's measurements. We represent the randomness of Alice's sampling using seed registers. Thus, the randomness used for Alice's choice of basis is represented as
Similarly, Alice's randomness for choice of a hash function for privacy amplification is represented as
Recall that m = s + k, where k is the weight of all strings in Θ. Measurement of Alice's system A of m qubits in Step 2 is represented using two CPTP maps: one acting on the systems in I, with outcome recorded in register X (by definition, these qubits are measured in the computational basis); and one acting on the systems inĪ, with outcome recorded in register V (by definition, these qubits are measured in the Hadamard basis).
and the second measurement, where the outcome is stored in register V , is defined by
where M 0,x A I := i∈I M 0,x i A i and the definition of M 1,v AĪ is analogous. We also introduce a hypothetical measurement for the sake of the security analysis. Consider the case where Alice measures all of her qubits in the Hadamard basis. In this case, instead of M I A→X|S Θ , Alice would use the measurement
Each of Alice's and Bob's measurements commute with each other as they all act on distinct quantum systems. We can thus define the total measurement map
The overall post-measurement state is denoted σ V W XY S Θ . We analogously define the hypothetical post-measurement stateσ V W ZY S Θ .
Alice's verification: Alice completes the verification procedure by comparing the V register to the W register. If they differ in less than kδ bits, then the test is passed. The test is represented by a function comp:
To record the value of this test, we use a flag F comp := comp(v, w).
The import of the outcome of this comparison test is that if Bob is good at guessing Alice's information in the Hadamard basis, it is unlikely that he is good at guessing Alice's information in the computational basis. This trade-off is represented in the uncertainty relation of Proposition 2.7.
Note that we can define the post-comparison test state, since A| I is disjoint from A|Ī and B| I is disjoint from B|Ī. The state is denoted τ ABV W S Θ |F comp =1 .
The following proposition shows that in order to ensure that Bob's knowledge of X is limited after a successful comparison test, and receiving the decryption key, his knowledge about Alice's hypothetical Hadamard measurement outcome must be bounded below.
Proposition 5.5. Let ǫ ≥ 0. Then
Proof. We apply Proposition 2.7 to the state τ ABV W S Θ |F comp =1 . To do this, we equate C = V W S Θ B ′ and E = S Θ B. Using the measurement maps M A→X|S Θ and M A→Z|S Θ and applying Proposition 2.7 then yields
We then apply the measurement map M B→Y |S Θ and discard S Θ . Finally, by Proposition 2.6, we note that
which concludes the proof.
In the spirit of [TL17], we provide an upper bound for the max-entropy quantity, thus establishing a lower bound for the min-entropy quantity.
Proposition 5.6. Letting ν ∈ (0, 1), we define ǫ(ν) := exp −sk 2 ν 2 m(k + 1) .
Then, for any ν ∈ (0, 1 2 − δ] such that ǫ(ν) 2 < Pr[F comp = 1] σ = Pr[F comp = 1]σ,
Proof. Define the event
Using Lemma 2.9, we get that
Given the stateσ ZY F comp =1 , we use Lemma 2.10 to remove the possibility of Ω and arrive at the smoothed stateσ ZY F comp with Pr[Ω]σ = 0 and
Since Pr[F comp = 1]σ = 1, we get that 
where g(ν) := s(1 − h(δ + ν)) − n.
Proof. By Proposition 5.6, we see that
Together, with Proposition 5.5, this means that
where q = 1 − h(δ + ν). Finally, applying Proposition 2.8, we obtain the desired inequality.
For the case where ǫ(ν) 2 ≥ Pr[F comp = 1] σ , we note that the trace distance ζX SF comp E∧F comp =1 − χX ⊗ζ SF comp E∧F comp =1 Tr is upper bounded by the trace of both states (Pr[F comp = 1] ζ ). Therefore, the inequalities Pr[F comp = 1] ζ ≤ ǫ(ν) 2 ≤ ǫ(ν) grants us the following corollary.
Corollary 5.8. For any ν ∈ (0, 1 2 − δ], the following holds:
ζX SF comp E∧F comp =1 − χX ⊗ ζ SF comp E∧F comp =1 Tr ≤ 1 2 2 −s(1−h(δ+ν))+n + 2ǫ(ν).
Finally, we would like to translate this statement into a probability that Bob would win Game 5.4. Let ζ g XSF comp E∧F comp =1 be the state of ζX SF comp E∧F comp =1 in the case that g ∈ {0, 1} was selected at the beginning of Game 5.4.
Corollary 5.9. The probability that Bob wins Game 5.4 is less than or equal to 1 2 + 2 1 2 2 −s(1−h(δ+ν))+n + 2ǫ(ν) .
Proof.
= 2 1 2 2 −s(1−h(δ+ν))+n + 2ǫ(ν) .
The conclusion follows from the operational meaning of the trace distance (see Section 2).
Security Reduction
We now show that the security of Game 5.3 can be reduced to that of Game 5.4. In order to do so, we construct a sequence of games starting at Game 5.3 and ending at Game 5.4. Each game will be winnable by the adversary (or Bob) with a probability only less than or equal to that of the subsequent game. The first new game, G, deprives A 1 of the classical portion of the ciphertext. In the second new game, G ′ , instead of selecting r uniformly at random, m EPR pairs are prepared, with one half of each being sent to the adversary, and the other half of each being measured in basis θ, yielding r. In the third new game, G ′′ , the aforementioned measurement, and hence the determination of r, is delayed until after running A 1 .
Proposition 5.10. The probability that A wins Game 5.3 is bounded above by the probability that Bob wins Game 5.4.
Proof. The probability that A wins Game 5.3 is given by the following formula:
The probability that Bob wins Game 5.4 is given by the following formula:
Let G be a game like Game 5.3 except that, in G, A 1 does not have access to |msg ⊕ x ⊕ u, p, q msg ⊕ x ⊕ u, p, q| .
Then
because, from the perspective of A 1 in Game 5.3, |msg ⊕ x ⊕ u, p, q msg ⊕ x ⊕ u, p, q| is uniformly random. Let G ′ be a game like G except that, in G ′ , instead of A 1 being given r θ r θ , m EPR pairs are prepared, yielding quantum systems A and B, of which the adversary A 1 is given B. System A is measured in basis θ yielding a string r, and A 1 then computes
We show that, due to the measurement of system A, adversary A 1 receives r θ r θ , where r is uniformly random. The post-measurement state, conditioned on the measurement of system A yielding outcome r, will be equivalent to 
which occurs with probability |ψ r 2 = 1 2 m . Therefore,
Let G ′′ be a game like G ′ except that, in G ′′ , instead of system A being measured before running A 1 , system A is measured after. Then
because the measurement and A 1 act on distinct systems, and therefore commute. G ′′ is like Game 5.4 except that, in the latter game, Bob is the party that prepares the state. Since allowing Bob to select the initial state can only increase Bob's chance of winning, it follows that
Theorem 5.11. Scheme 4.1 is certified deletion secure.
Proof. By Corollary 5.9, Bob can win Game 5.4 with at most a probability of 1 2 + 2 1 2 2 −s(1−h(δ+ν))+n + 2ǫ(ν) .
By Proposition 5.10, this also serves as an upper bound for the probability that A wins Game 5.3. Since Game 5.3 is a certified deletion attack for Scheme 4.1, we see that Scheme 4.1 is η-certified deletion secure for η(λ) = 2 1 2 2 −(s(λ))(1−h(δ+ν))+n + 2 exp −(s(λ))(k(λ)) 2 ν 2 (m(λ))((k(λ)) + 1) ,
which is negligible for large enough functions s, k.
